Baker v. Corcoran
220 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2000) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 9
Fall 9-1-2000
Baker v. Corcoran 220 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2000)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Fourth Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School
of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Baker v. Corcoran 220 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2000), 13 Cap. DEF J. 133 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol13/iss1/9
Baker v. Corcoran
220 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2000)
L Facts
On June 6, 1991, Jane Tyson ("Tyson") was shot and killed in the
parking lot of the Westview Mall near Baltimore, Maryland. As Tyson and
her grandchildren were entering Tyson's car to return home, a man ran up
to the car and shot Tyson in the head. A witness in the parking lot ob-
served two men run fromTyson's car and enter a blue Chevrolet Blazer.
The witness followed the Blazer, recorded the license number, and gave it
to the police. Police stopped the Blazer a short time later. The passenger
fled on foot, but the driver, Gregory Lawrence ("Lawrence"), was arrested.
The passenger, Wesley Eugene Baker ("Baker"), was arrested soon thereafter.
At the time of Baker's arrest, police observed what appeared to be blood on
his shoe, sock, and leg. The blood was later determined to be Tyson's
blood. Tyson's purse and wallet were found along the path of Baker's flight
from the stopped Blazer. A search of the Blazer revealed the firearm used
to shoot Tyson. Baker's fingerprints were found on the driver's side door
and window of Tyson's car.
Baker was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree
felony murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and the use of a handgun
during the commission of a felony. At trial, counsel's strategy was to
concede Baker's involvement in the crime but argue that Baker was not a
principal in the first degree. Counsel requested a special verdict requiring
the jury to answer whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that Baker was a principal in the first degree.' The jury found that Baker
was a principal in the first degree and Baker was convicted on all counts.
Baker elected to be sentenced by the court rather than the jury. The court
found that the State had proved one aggravating circumstance and rejected
Baker's mitigation evidence. Baker was sentenced to death.4
In December of 1994, Baker filed a petition for post-conviction relief
("PCR"), alleging that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective. The
Maryland Court of Appeals denied the application for leave to appeal and
1. Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 282.
3. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENT S 413(e)(1)(i) (Supp. 1999)
(defining principal in the first degree).
4. Baker, 220 F.3d at 282. The trial court found as an aggravating circumstance that
the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES
& PUNISHMENTS S 413(d)(10) (Supp. 1999).
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the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.' The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland appointed federal habeas coun-
sel. In October of 1996, Baker moved to reopen the state post-conviction
relief hearing, alleging that certain claims were not presented in the initial
proceeding as a result of counsel's incompetence. The motion to reopen
included claims that the trial court had issued an unconstitutional instruc-
tion regarding the meaning of reasonable doubt, that trial and appellate
counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the reason-
able doubt instruction and to challenge it on appeal, and that trial counsel
failed to conduct a proper investigation.6 The state court denied the motion
to reopen the PCR hearing and the Maryland Court of Appeals again denied
application for leave to appeal."
In March of 1997, Baker filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Maryland had
satisfied the "opt-in" requirements of 28 U.S.C. SS 2261(b) and (c), and that
Baker's petition was barred by the 180-day limitation period imposed on
capital defendants in "opt-in" states! The district court conducted a hearing
on the State's motion to dismiss Baker's habeas petition and denied the
motion.9 The district court denied habeas relief, but granted a certificate of
appealability to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
on all issues raised on appeal. "'
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit held that Maryland had not satisfied the "opt-in"
requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2261, and that Baker's appeal was not time
barred." The court considered Baker's claims on the merits, held that Baker
was not entitled to relief on his claims, and affirmed the ruling of the district
court. 
12
III Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Satisfying the Opt.in"Requirements of28 U.S.C. S 2261
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") amended Chapter 153 of Title 28, and added Chapter 154 which
5. Baker, 220 F.3d at 283.
6. Id.
7. id.
8. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2261 (b)-(c) (2000).
9. Baker, 220 F.3d at 283-84.
10. Id. at 284. The Maland state law issues involved in Baker's appeal are not
discussed below due to their la of application in Virginia.
11. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §2261.
12. Baker, 220 F.3d at 297-98.
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applies to habeas petitions filed by state prisoners subject to capital sen-
tences." Charter 154 imposes stringent limitations on habeas petitions in
capital cases. 'To take advantage of the limitations imposed, a state must
first satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2261 (b) and (c).' s The require-
ments imposed by S 2261 (b) and (c) are the following: (1) the state must
establish "by statute, rule of its court of last resort, or by another agency
authorized by State law, a mechanism for appointment, compensation, and
payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State
post-conviction proceedings;" 6 (2) the mechanism "must provide standards
of competency" for state post-conviction counsel; and (3) the mechanism
"must provide for the entry of an order by a court of record" appointi,
counsel or denying counsel when a petitioner is found not to be indigent.'
A fourth requirement not addressed in Baker is that the state must affirma-
tively offer counsel to the petitioner." The "opt-in" requirements operate
to ensure that states seeking greater federal deference to habeas decisions in
capital cases provide meaningful habeas proceedings at the state level.'9
In Baker, the Fourth Circuit found that Maryland failed to satisfy the
* opt-in requirements of Chapter 154.20 Specifically, the court found the
following: (1) Maryland does not adequately compensate post-conviction
counsel; (2) the competency standard of Maryland Regulations Code Title
14, section 06.02.05(B)(1) is inadequate and is not applied to appointed
counsel; and (3) the mechanism does not provide for a court order address-
ing the appointment of counsel or a determination that petitioner is not
indigent. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that Baker's petition was
not time barred.'
13. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L.No. 104-132,§ 107 (a), 110
Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 5 2261 (2000)).
14. Baker, 220 F.3d at 284; see 28 U.S.C. S 2261.
15. Baker, 220 F.3d at 284; see 28 U.S.C. S 2261 (b)-(c) (2000).
16. 28 U.S.C. S 2261(b).
17. 28 U.S.C. S 2261(c).
18. Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp. 2d 497, 506 (E.D. Va. 1998).
19. Baker, 220 F.3d at 284 (citing Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir.
1996)).
20. Id. at 287.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 286-87. The State argued that it provides adequate compensation for post-
conviction counsel. Id. at 285. The court found that Maryland's system of compensation
resulted in substantial loss to attorneys and their firms, and therefore did not adequately
compensate post-conviction counsel. Id. at 285-86. The State contended that it is not required
to promulgate competency standards forp rst-conviction counsel. Id. at 286-87. The Fourth
Circuit flatly rejected this argument baseu upon the plain language of S 2261(b). Id. at 287.
Finally, the State contended that literal compliance with S 2261(c) was not an essential
component of "opt-in" eligibility. Id. Section 2261(c) requires the entering of a court order
addressing the appointment, refusal, or denial of post-conviction counsel. Id. The Fourth
2000]
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B. Federal Issues and the Exhaustion Doctrine
Baker claimed that the trial court's premeditation instruction violated
the Due Process Clause.23 The State argued that Baker's due process chal-
lenge to the premeditation instruction was defaulted because it was never
presented to the state courts.2" Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1), a federal court
may not grant a writ of habeas corpus until the petitioner has first ex-
hausted his state remedies by presenting his claims to the highest state
court." Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c), a petitioner shall not be deemed to have
exhausted state remedies "if he has the right under the law of the state to
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."2" A claim may
be treated as exhausted if it is dear that the claim would be procedurally
barred under state law, even if not presented to highest state court.27 In
order to satisfy exhaustion, the petitioner need not cite "book and verse on
the federal [C]onstitution," but the claim must be "fairly presented" to the
state court.2" Claims must be patently presented by setting out the facts and
the controlling legal principles." Most importantly, the presentation to the
state court of a similar state claim does not satisfy the exhaustion require-
ments for the federal issue.' Baker only challenged the premeditation
instruction as having no basis in Maryland law, but never asserted in state
habeas that the instruction violated the federal Constitution." Baker
Circuit rejected this argument on its face because S 2261(c) explicitly requires the entrance
of a court order. id.
23. Id. at 288.
24. Id. The challenged jury instruction on premeditation read:
Premeditated means that the Defendant thought about the killing and that there
was time, even if brief, for the Defendant to form the intent to kiH. The premedi-
tated intent to kill must be formed before the killing. Premeditation requires
proof that the conscious and deliberate intention to do the fatal act existed for an
appreciable time before the act was done. The law does not require that the
intention to kill exist for any considerable length of time before the fatal act was
done; it is sufficient if there is time for the mind to think and consider the act and
then determine to do it. The intensity and effect of a wound may provide
adequate evidence of a premeditated and determined effort, not simp to harm,
but to destroy any semblance of life remain injane Tyson. If the kiling stems
from a choice made as the result of thought, however sliort the struggle between
the intention and the act, it -is sufficient to characterize the crime as deliberate
and premeditated murder.
Id. at 288. The intensity and effect of a wound may provide adequate evidence of a premedi-
tated... effort" language was the portion of the instruction challenged by Baker. Id.
25. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (b)(1) (2000).
26. Baker, 220 F.3d at 288; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (c) (2000).
27. Baker, 220 F.3d at 288 (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1999)).
28. Id. at 289 (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (per curiam)).
31. Id. Baker also relied on West v. Wrihbt, 931 F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'don
other grounds, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (holding that "[any challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict in a state prosecution is necessarily a due process challenge.to the
[Vol. 13:1
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contended on appeal that the constitutional components of his claim were
readily apparent and thus the issue was fairly presented. 2 The Fourth
Circuit found Baker's argument "flatly inconsistent" with the principles of
exhaustion and held that Baker's Due Process Clause challenge to the
premeditation instruction was not exhausted in state court.3
IV Conclusion
Several federal courts have held that Virginia does not satisfy the "opt-
in" requirements and is not entitled to the expedited review provisions of
Chapter 154.-' The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in Weeks v. Angelone cited numerous decisions holding that
Virginia may not "opt-in" under Chapter 154 because the Commonwealth
does not provide a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and
payment of reasonable litigation expenses for counsel.3 ' The Common-
wealth's failure to establish a mechanism that provides for meaningful state
conviction"). The Fourth Circuit in Baker held that West was inapplicable. Baker, 220 F.3d
at 289. Baker's challenge was to the constitutionality of the permissive inference, while the
challenge in West was to the sufficiency of the evidence under any jury instruction. Id.
32. Baker, 220 F.3d at 289. The principle of exhaustion requires that a claim is proce-
durally defaulted if the claim could have been raised on direct appeal but was not. The State
contended that Baker's claims were not fairly presented to the state court in his motion to
reopen the PCR hearing. The State argued that Baker's claims would be procedurally barred
in the Maryland courts. The Fourth Circuit found that Maryland law expressly allowed the
right to raise new claims in a motion to reopen a PCR proceeding. The Fourth Circuit found
that (1) the state court's decision not to review Baker's new claims did not mean that the
claims were unexhausted; and (2) Baker exhausted his claims in state court, notwithstanding
the denial of the motion to reopen the PCR. As a result, the Fourth Circuit was able to reach
the merits of Baker's claims. Id.
33. Id. Baker made no argument that cause or prejudice should have excused his default
so the court did not address that issue. Id.
34. See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir. 1996) ("the Virginia statutes
and regulations do not specifically provide for compensation or payment of litigation
expenses of appointed counsel, as SS 107 requires"); see also Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F.
Supp. 1222, 1241-42 (E.D. Va. 1996) (discussing why Virginia fails to meet the compensation
requirement); Wright v. Angelone, 944 F. Supp. 460, 464-65 (E.D. Va. 1996) (same).
35. 4 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Va. 1998).
36. Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp. 2d 497,506-07 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that Virginia
fails to meet the first opt-in' requirement of a comprehensive mechanism for the appoint-
ment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses for counsel); see Bennett,
92 F.3d at 1342 ("the Virginia statutes and regulations do not specifically provide for compen-
sation or payment of litigation expenses of appointed counsel'); see also Satcher, 944 F. Supp
at 1241-42 (holding that this requirement could only be satisfied by strict, rather than
substantial, compliance and since there has been no change in Virginia law to satisfy this
requirement, the Commonwealth is not entitled to the special review provisions of Chapter




habeas proceedings prevents the quid pro quo arrangement available for
states that comply with Chapter 154.' 7
Baker's petition for federal habeas relief is a reminder that every death
penalty case is at the same time a state case and a federal case. Defense
counsel must always keep this in mind and constantly be on the alert for
federal issues to preserve for appeal. In addition to recognizing the issues,
counsel must raise the issues and exhaust all state remedies in order to
preserve those issues for federal review. Raising a state law issue that impli-
cates a constitutional issue without simultaneously and specifically arguing
the federal issue is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal in the federal
courts.
Matthew S. Nichols
37. The effect in Virginia is that habeas petitioners have one year in which to file their
petitions instead of the 180-day limit for petitioners in "opt-in" states. Williams v. Taylor, 189
F.3d 421, 431 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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